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1. Introduction 
 
It is natural to approach a book entitled Being Realistic about Reasons with a 
degree of trepidation. After all, the admonishment “Be realistic!” is usually a 
way of telling you that you can’t have what you want. Happily, in this case, 
the implication is misleading. For T. M. Scanlon argues that we can have 
everything that he hopes for with respect to normativity. And this is not 
because his hopes are skimpy or idiosyncratic. For example, Scanlon claims 
that we can: 
 
 Vindicate the idea that there are truths about reasons  
 Vindicate the genuine normativity of reasons  
 Vindicate the stance-independence of fundamental normative truths  
 Explain the modal connections between normative truths and other 
truths 
 Explain how we can have knowledge of normative truths 
 
We agree that these are good desiderata for a metaethical theory. Not so long 
ago, it would have seemed obvious that taking these desiderata to be 
satisfied marked one as a realist of a rather strong sort about the normative. 
But times have become more complicated. Several philosophers have 
followed Simon Blackburn’s lead, and sought to show how one’s theoretical 
understanding of ethics can start out with the characteristic materials of ur-
anti-realists like A. J. Ayer (1946), and nonetheless end up sounding hard to 
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distinguish from ur-realists like G. E. Moore (1903). Scanlon is clear that he 
wants nothing to do with the non-cognitivism that underlies such ‘quasi-
realist’ views. But he appears sympathetic at times to the idea that the 
desiderata just mentioned do not commit one to an expansive ontology.  
 
In this, Scanlon is similar to so-called quietists like Ronald Dworkin (2011), 
Matthew Kramer (2009), and Derek Parfit (2011).1 These philosophers 
characteristically accept something like the quasi-realist’s negative program, 
arguing that commitments like those just mentioned do not saddle one with 
ontological commitments that require special defense. However, they 
simultaneously reject the positive expressivist program that is supposed by 
the quasi-realist to provide the underlying interpretive alternative to these 
putative ontological commitments. Because the expressivist program faces a 
familiar family of burdens, this alternative, if it could be made to work, would 
potentially be an extremely attractive metanormative position. However, this 
potential can only be realized if views like Scanlon’s can do the sorts of 
explanatory work that seemed to call for a robust, ontologically committal 
realism – or at least the positive, expressivist element of the quasi-realist 
program – in the first place.  
 
In this symposium contribution we have two aims: To ask for more details 
about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view (while raising doubts about the 
likelihood of Scanlon being able to fill in those details in a coherent way); and 
to raise independent objections to the view, especially to its (central) 
application in metaethics. We ask for more details on the central notion of a 
domain – and with it, on Scanlon’s official criterion of existence (§2), on the 
sense in which his theory is meant to be ontologically thin (§3), and on the 
role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon’s criterion of existence (§4). We 
then challenge Scanlon’s account’s in three ways. First, we argue that it fails 
to secure promised explanatory payoffs, for instance, vis-à-vis supervenience 
and epistemology (§5). Second, we argue that it is unclear how, at the end of 
the day, Scanlon’s account differs from an unattractive version of 
hermeneutical fictionalism (§6). Finally, we note that the book does little to 
argue for the account that Scanlon endorses.  
 
A recurrent theme throughout our discussion will be some pessimism about 
Scanlon being able to do all he wants to do without committing himself 
ontologically in ways he is eager to avoid. One way of focusing attention on 
this worry is to compare Scanlon’s account – in a way he never explicitly does 
– to that of the philosopher we’ll call the Modest Rationalist Metaphysician 
(more briefly: Modest). She is modest in the sense that – like Scanlon – she 
grants that scientific investigation is (of course!) our overwhelmingly best 
guide to the nomic structure of the actual world. However, and perhaps 
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unlike the “Quinean” whom Scanlon treats as his foil (18)2, she takes science 
not to be an obviously helpful guide to topics like freedom, justice or 
phenomenal qualia. She is instead confident that we can answer important 
questions about these topics from the armchair, a priori. But unlike Scanlon, 
she rejects a view of existence that relativizes or contextualizes it. She thinks 
– in this respect, perhaps like the Quinean – that “exists” is univocal, and that 
there is nothing ontologically “thin” about the seemingly ontologically heavy 
commitments of realism about normative discourse. Modest may be a robust, 
non-naturalist realist, or she may be naturalist realist of sorts. But she is no 
quietist. And it will prove useful to see how Scanlon’s views compare to 
Modest’s. Thus, we will return to her from time to time.  
 
 
2. Domains 
 
The concept DOMAIN is at the heart of Scanlon’s metaphilosophy in this book. 
This concept appears to provide the most general element of Scanlon’s 
understanding of metaphysics, and seems crucial to his thinking that his view 
is ontologically thin. Scanlon rejects Quine’s “…exclusive emphasis on the 
physical world” (18), and diagnoses his main mistake as that of assuming 
that there is one set of rules that determine what there is.  
 
Scanlon’s proposed alternative to this Quinean assumption is as follows:   
 
…the truth values of statements about one domain, insofar as they do not conflict 
with statements of some other domain, are properly settled by the standards of the 
domain that they are about. (19) 
 
We read this as committing to the following principle about true 
propositions: 
 
Truth-Domain A proposition p is true if (i) there is a domain D1 such that p is 
about D1, and the truth of p is entailed by the standards of D1, and (ii) there 
is no domain D2 that conflicts with D1. 
 
Truth-Domain raises several pressing questions.  
 
First: What makes a proposition count as being ‘about’ a domain? This seems 
at least somewhat metaphorical: literally speaking, the number two is prime is 
about the number two, not about mathematics. What exactly, then, is the 
relation between a proposition and “its” domain?  
 
Second, notice that Truth-Domain provides only a sufficient condition for 
truth. This is because we are not told what happens when the standards of 
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two domains do conflict. Scanlon's denial of the existence of witches 
(presumably licensed by the supernatural domain, but ruled out by the 
empirical one) indicates that he thinks that in some cases of conflict, certain 
domains ‘trump’ others.  But we are given no account of what grounds such 
domain-trumping. In this case, why is it that the empirical domain trumps 
the supernatural one and not the other way around? Because Scanlon 
suggests that the normative domain does not conflict with other domains 
(22), it may seem that he only needs the sufficient condition for his 
metanormative purposes, and that he can thus ignore these further 
questions. But this is not so – Scanlon’s metanormative view rests on a 
general meta-metaphysical picture, and so it’s fair play to raise doubts about 
that picture. And it’s not clear that the outlines of this picture can be filled in 
without either entailing implausible implications, or else committing to one 
super-domain (the standards of which settle all domain-conflicts). The 
problem with the latter move is that once saddled with such a super-domain, 
Scanlon’s view seems a mere terminological variant of Modest’s: What in 
Scanlon’s dialect is thought of as existence in this super-domain is what in 
Modest’s dialect is thought of as existence sans phrase. It’s hard to see how 
progress has been made.  
 
The most pressing family of questions, however, is about how to understand 
the notion of a domain. We raise questions first, about how to understand 
what a domain is; second, about how to individuate domains; and third, 
about the relations between domains’ metaphysics and epistemology. 
Together, these worries show how much more work needs to be done to 
explain domains within the context of Scanlon’s views, and how unlikely it is 
that it can be satisfactorily done.  
 
First, consider what a domain is. One natural way of understanding domains 
takes them to be individuated metaphysically, by the nature of the entities 
they contain, or some such. This way of individuating domains is not 
available to Scanlon, because it makes entities explanatorily prior to 
domains, and defeats the hope of achieving an ontologically thin kind of 
realism. We worry that some of the initial plausibility of Scanlon’s talk of 
domains depends on implicit appeal to this natural way of thinking of 
domains, and is thus illusory.  
 
Scanlon says instead that   
 
a domain is better understood in terms of the kind of claims it involves, and hence in 
terms of concepts that it deals with, such as number, set, physical object, reason, or 
morally right action. (19) 
   
This quote may be understood as hinting at neo-Carnapian directions. But 
Scanlon rejects such a reading (19 n.3): despite the fact that domains should 
be understood in terms of concepts, the ‘procedures appropriate to a domain’ 
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are not settled by linguistic rules for the use of those concepts, a la Carnap. 
While we are sympathetic with Scanlon’s rejection of Carnapianism, Carnap’s 
view at least provides relatively clear ‘rules to the game’. Once both the 
metaphysical and Carnapian approach are off the table, we are simply unsure 
we have any grip on the notion, absent a positive story that Scanlon does not 
provide. What sort of thing is a domain, then? (A collection of concepts? A 
collection of sentences? Of true sentences? A collection of truth-makers? Etc.) 
 
Second, how are domains individuated? We are told that there are at least 
the following three domains: science, mathematics, and the normative (19). 
But we are not told, generally, what conditions have to be satisfied for some 
putative domain D to count as distinct from another putative domain D*. Far 
from addressing this question, Scanlon says: “…I mean to leave the question 
of what domains there are entirely open” (23). We don’t think he can afford 
to do this. For, to the extent that we understand the notion of a domain, we 
could think of the Quinean view that Scanlon rejects as simply the view that 
there is a single universal domain. On the other extreme, consider a 
permissive view, on which every concept is associated with a domain: on this 
view, there is an APPLE domain and an ORANGE domain. We also don’t think 
this is Scanlon’s view. It would seem to render domains too trivial to be 
explanatorily useful. Further, a multiplicity of domain generates a 
multiplicity of conflicts between domains. So depending on how conflicts 
between domains are settled, the permissive view may lead either to an 
ontology that may be too permissive even by Scanlon's lights, or to an 
extremely austere one.  
 
This leaves us with a familiar dialectic. Scanlon wants the concept DOMAIN to 
do central work in his argument. But there is a reasonable suspicion that any 
view between neo-Quinean universalism and permissivism will be unstable. 
We thus need at least the sketch of a non-ad hoc way of explaining which 
(and how many) domains there are. Absent such an explanation, it is unclear 
whether the notion can do any work.   
 
Third, what is the relationship between the metaphysics and epistemology of 
domains? As we noted above, Scanlon claims that truth-values within 
domains are properly ‘settled’ by the standards of those domains (19). Is 
settling a metaphysical or epistemological relation? Is it the metaphysical 
relation of truth-making or truth-explaining, or is it that epistemological one 
of providing access or justification or knowledge? Scanlon nowhere 
explains.3 The worry, of course, is that by exploiting this ambiguity, Scanlon 
can make certain claims appear more intuitively plausible than they are. The 
challenge is thus to disambiguate in a way that will conserve this plausibility. 
We are not sure this can be done (we give some reasons below). But this, at 
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any rate, is what must be done if Scanlon is to have a plausible 
metanormative view.   
 
Recall Modest. Scanlon and Modest are both confident that there are 
normative facts and that we can discover them. Thus far, it is not clear how 
Scanlon’s appeal to domains is supposed to show that confidence to be 
reasonable in a way that Modest’s is not. Indeed, given how thin our grasp of 
domains in Scanlon’s sense is, it is possible that Modest might also accept 
that there are such domains. (Of course, there is a clear danger that unless 
they do sufficient explanatory work, domains will simply amount to an 
unattractive theoretical epicycle.) So far, then, it’s hard to see what 
advantage Scanlon can claim over Modest. At the very least, it is hard to see 
how invoking domains can secure such an advantage.  
 
 
3. Easy ontology? 
 
Scanlon, to repeat, seems to think of his view as less ontologically committed, 
or perhaps as committed in some more minimal or thin sense, than those of 
other realists, like Modest. In this section we try to better understand this 
claim, and why Scanlon thinks it may be true.  
 
As we have seen, the concept DOMAIN is central to Scanlon’s account. For – as 
we suggested in the previous section – Scanlon appears committed to   
 
Truth-Domain A proposition p is true if (i) there is a domain D1 such that p is 
about D1, and the truth of p is entailed by the standards of D1, and (ii) there 
is no domain D2 that conflicts with D1   
 
In virtue of its generality, this thesis applies to ontological propositions as 
much as any others. As we have noted, Scanlon seeks not to commit himself 
to a view about how many domains there are. However, in one important 
passage, he considers an objection that attributes to him the view that (a) 
any well-defined, internally coherent “way of talking” that did not conflict 
with other domains constitutes its own domain, and (b) that if this way of 
talking specifies truth conditions for certain existential claims, then where 
those conditions are satisfied, the relevant claims are true (27). Importantly, 
Scanlon at least appears to embrace this liberal interpretation of his view.  
 
But suppose that we have an adequately regimented way of thinking about 
magical elves, understood as existing in a wholly causally isolated partition of 
the universe. On the liberal interpretation of Scanlon’s view, it seems that 
these conditions entail that it is true that the elves exist. Now, this would 
mark a clear difference between Scanlon and Modest (who presumably 
rejects Truth-Domain, accepts some domain-independent criteria for 
existence, and can rely on them to reject the existence of these magical elves). 
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But this would not be good news for Scanlon. Accepting such magical elves 
into one’s ontology strikes us as hard to swallow, to put it mildly.4 And that 
makes it hard for us to believe that there are no domain-independent 
constraints that restrict the scope of what it is reasonable to believe exists, 
and indeed, of what exists.  
 
Scanlon himself considers the objection that his view is “too [ontologically] 
permissive”, and that it allows existence to be vindicated “so cheaply” (27). 
Scanlon replies that the relevant existence questions are settled by the 
standards of relevant domains. But it is not clear how this is supposed to help 
address the objection. After all, the objection was pointing out a troubling 
consequence of this very commitment. 
 
One way to read Scanlon here is as embracing the strategy of the proponent 
of ‘easy ontology’. For example, on Amie Thomasson’s view, (e.g. 2014, 142), 
the thesis that whenever there are some simples ‘arranged table-wise’ there is 
also a table is a truth which is guaranteed by the meaning of ‘table’. The 
‘easiness’ of Thomasson’s ontology is supposed to be exactly a function of her 
assumption that the ‘easy’ ontological commitments are a function of  
(i) ordinary science and ‘difficult’ ontology (which license our belief 
that there are some simples arranged tablewise), together with 
(ii) analytic truths (like the ‘table’ thesis, above) that serve as bridge 
principles, taking us to new ontological commitment.  
On Thomasson’s account, element (ii) is what is supposed to spare us from 
additional ontological anxieties about tables (e.g.). The relevant existence 
claims (“There are tables”; “there is a table in front of me”) just follow from 
the analytic bridge principles that constitute what we count as true, qua 
existence of tables (together with the facts about the existence of simples arranged 
tablewise). The fact that in posing the objection to his view Scanlon adverts to 
coherent ways of talking might seem to support a Thomasson-style 
interpretation. As we have seen in the previous section, however, Scanlon 
rejects the idea that the standards for a given domain are conceptual truths 
(19 n.3). And this seems to rule out attributing (ii) to him. However, (ii) is 
precisely the part of Thomasson’s view that is supposed to explain why the 
relevant ontological commitments are ‘easy’ or ‘lightweight’.  
 
Can Scanlon’s view be revised along Thomasson-like lines, by accepting 
analytic or conceptual bridge-principles that will secure an easy ontological 
status for normative truths, properties, and objects? The most natural way of 
understanding such a move would see it as endorsing a naturalist reduction 
of the normative, a reduction Scanlon is invested in rejecting. Furthermore, it 
                                                          
4 The example is a bit silly (if conclusive). But some deist views, for instance, and perhaps 
some other serious views in the history of metaphysics, can also serve as examples here. 
Surely, the existence of a coherent and well-regimented Deist theological practice would not 
itself guarantee the truth of its central commitments. 
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will seem to be an a priori, perhaps analytic, version of reductionism, one 
that faces perhaps especially serious problems. And of course, such a view is 
not quietist at all – rather than avoiding the metaphysical discussion Scanlon 
hopes to bypass, it is a major move within it. In order to endorse a 
Thomasson-style line, then, Scanlon has to abandon much of the rest of what 
he thinks, and to deal with numerous challenges he hopes to avoid. If he 
thinks he can help himself to such a line without committing to a naturalist 
reduction, he owes us an explanation how. And if he can do none of these 
things, it’s still hard to see how he can avoid the commitment to the existence 
of magical elves.   
 
Despite this, several passages in Scanlon suggest that he thinks of ontological 
commitment as unproblematic. For example:   
 
We make claims expressed by the existential quantifier in many domains, but what 
is required to justify any existential claim, and what follows from such a claim, 
varies, depending on the kind of thing that is claimed to exist. The claim that 
mountains exist is licensed by and licenses certain other claims about the physical 
world. The claim that there exists a number or set of a certain kind is licensed by 
and licenses certain other mathematical claims. And in each case that is all there is 
to it. Nothing more is claimed or required. (25, emphasis ours) 
 
We find this passage puzzling. First, it is again very hard to distinguish 
metaphysics from epistemology here. Second, one might take the passage to 
be grasping towards a view on which existence claims per se are somehow 
insubstantial, and so the existential quantifier is no guide to metaphysics.5 
Such a view would indeed distinguish between Scanlon and Modest. Scanlon 
says that the general idea of existence seems ‘empty’ in contrast to the 
‘significance’ that domain-relative existence claims can have (23). But so far 
this seems to be an unhelpful metaphor. We of course get more information if 
we know that x exists and is an F, than if we merely know that x exists. And 
since domains are (somehow) linked to specific concepts on Scanlon’s view, 
knowing that x exists in a certain domain will presumably thereby be 
informative. But the existing/nonexisting part seems like a distinct and 
rather important dimension in either case.  
 
One might think that Scanlon could reject this by arguing for minimalism 
about ‘exists’ talk. Scanlon does appear to accept minimalism about ‘fact’ talk, 
according to which facts either are ‘true thoughts’ [i.e. propositions?] (cf. 45), 
or are explanatorily parasitic on them (cf. 66). However, Scanlon denies that 
his account of existence is ‘minimalist’ (28). We agree: it is unclear why 
commitment to the explanatory basicness of domains would lighten the 
ontological load.  
 
                                                          
5 See also Scanlon’s remark (66) about facts being merely the reflections of true thoughts.  
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Another possibility is that Scanlon takes the ontological ‘thinness’ of the 
normative to follow from his endorsement of minimalism about normative 
properties (45). It is not clear what Scanlon means by ‘minimalism’ here, but 
he makes this claim immediately after drawing a contrast between two sorts 
of concepts. Scanlon notes that some concepts (e.g. WATER) are such that an 
adequate grasp of the concept does not guarantee knowledge of the nature of 
the property predicated by that concept, while in other cases adequate grasp 
of the concept discloses the nature of the relevant property (43). So, perhaps 
the idea is that properties whose natures are fully disclosed by the relevant 
concepts are distinctively ‘minimal’ in the sense of being mere reflections of 
our predicative practices (cf. 45 n. 46).  
 
But this interpretation too is problematic. First, Scanlon argues that the 
concept REASON is nature-revealing, but he also argues that the concept 
MORALLY WRONG is not. If property-minimality is associated with a concept 
being nature-revealing, this means that many normative properties will thus 
not be minimal. And this in turn means that we lose the prospect of a general 
contrast between the ontology of the normative and that of the non-
normative here.  
 
Second, and more importantly, it is hard to understand what a concept’s 
being nature-revealing has to do with the related property’s being ‘minimal’ 
in any interesting sense. For example, phenomenal concepts are among the 
best candidates for being nature-revealing (see e.g. Chalmers (2003)), but 
this in no way suggests that phenomenal properties are ‘minimal’ in any 
metaphysical sense.  
 
We have thus yet to find a helpful contrast that would show Scanlon to have 
fewer ontological burdens than Modest. Furthermore, there's the worry that 
Scanlon is going to be committed to lots of things that Modest will reasonably 
eschew – like those elves, and indeed, domains – without a clear sense of why 
he is entitled to be less perturbed by these commitments than Modest would 
be by hers.  
 
 
4. Pragmatism? 
 
In this section, we consider another important interpretation of Scanlon, as a 
pragmatist. One way to motivate this interpretation is to notice a structural 
problem for Truth-Domain: if all truth is relativized to domains, how are we 
to assess the truth of claims about the existence of domains, or, indeed, of 
Truth-Domain itself? Suppose there were a domain relative to which we 
could answer all of these questions. That domain would sound suspiciously 
privileged. Arguably, existence relative to that domain would be what really 
counts, and that domain would thus seem like an ideal candidate to provide a 
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privileged existential quantifier, which is precisely what would turn 
Scanlon’s position into a terminological variant of Modest’s.  
 
Scanlon appears to notice this central problem for his view. He says:  
 
…the question about domains is not whether they exist but whether they provide a 
helpful way of discussing certain matters. (23) 
 
This reply is not isolated; it is part of a repeated theme in the book (for 
example, compare pp. 16-17, 24, 27, 85). But this reply is initially 
disorienting. Scanlon has told us that domains are the central organizing 
category in metaphysics. The next natural question is thus seemingly which 
domains are there? But now we are told this isn’t the question. What could 
that mean? 
 
One idea is that domain existence is not the question because the answer to 
this question is a trivial ‘yes’, in accord with the sort of easy ontology idea 
discussed in the previous section. However, because the most promising way 
of interpreting Scanlon as an easy ontologist itself appealed to domains, this 
interpretation runs directly into the problem that we introduced this section 
with.  
 
Another idea is that domain existence is not the question because domains 
are not the sort of thing we can intelligibly ask existence questions about. 
Scanlon sometimes makes claims about the limits of meaningful application 
of certain concepts, such as THE WORLD (24). But he also emphasizes that there 
can be meaningful ‘external’ questions about claims in a domain (23), and (as 
we have seen) he proposes to leave the question of how many domains there 
are open (23), which would be odd if this question was meaningless. And, 
substantively, it does seem highly implausible that this question is 
meaningless (see, for instance, Enoch 2011, section 5.3.2).  
 
In this section we explore a third, pragmatist reading of passages like the one 
quoted above. On this reading, the question of whether there are domains 
may well be intelligible and have a non-trivial answer. However, rather than 
simply assessing our evidence concerning whether a given domain exists, we 
are supposed to ask whether supposing that a domain exists provides a 
helpful way of discussing certain matters. Indeed, perhaps such pragmatic 
considerations are not just our path to the right answer regarding a domain’s 
existence – perhaps they are what determines what the right answer is. One 
initial piece of support for this reading is that the passage above comes 
immediately after Scanlon invokes Carnap. And for Carnap, ‘external’ 
questions are (when intelligible) to be understood (and so answered) 
pragmatically.  
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This pragmatist reading also seems to fit with other important passages from 
Scanlon. For example, the passage just quoted continues: 
 
To say that it does invites, first, worries like Mackie’s…. And if we respond to this 
first worry by denying that numbers, say, are part of the natural world, while still 
insisting that they are part of “the world” we invite questions about what this 
shadowy “world” is to which numbers and perhaps other non-spatial entities all 
belong. It is better to avoid such questions altogether. (24, emphasis ours) 
 
The claim here does not seem to be that the relevant ‘external’ questions 
cannot be answered, or have an easy answer. Rather the claim seems to be 
that it is in some sense better to avoid them.6  
 
This reading would also complete the explanation of why Scanlon might be 
an easy ontologist about intra-domain ontological questions. According to 
Truth-Domain, such questions are settled by the standards of certain 
domains. According to the pragmatist reading we now suggest, we do not 
need to seek out evidence for the existence of the relevant domains, but 
should instead simply ask whether they are useful posits. If assertability 
ultimately bottoms out in usefulness in this way, that constitutes a 
straightforward sense in which our ontological commitments are thin. And 
on such a reading, of course, the differences between Scanlon and Modest – 
who has no pragmatist bone in her body – couldn’t be clearer.  
 
This synthesis is supported by the following striking passage:  
 
My answer is that the question about [certain] entities is not whether they really 
exist. This question is settled by the standards of the domain, assuming, as I have 
stipulated, that their existence does not entail implausible claims about other 
domains, such as the natural world. The question is only whether we have any reason 
to be concerned with these entities and their properties. (27, emphasis ours). 
 
The beginning of this passage tells us that the question of whether certain 
entities exist is settled by the totality of intra-domain facts (absent conflict). 
This supports the easy ontology part of the interpretation. The end of this 
passage suggests that the only remaining question is whether we have any 
reason to be concerned with the entities posited within a certain domain. 
This supports the pragmatist part of the interpretation.7  
 
                                                          
6 If we are on the right track here, we would love more details. When we evaluate talk about 
a certain domain, what is the metric for better or worse ways of talking? Are all of our 
reasons significant (can I aptly believe in those elves in order to make my grandma happy?) 
or are the relevant reasons restricted, e.g. to familiar theoretical virtues? Different ways of 
developing the view here could make it appear much more or less pragmatist.  See also note 
11, below.  
7 Also compare: "we have no reasons to be concerned with our general ontological 
commitments in Quine's sense..." (23)  
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If this synthesis correctly represents Scanlon’s view, it invites several 
(related) concerns. First, and rather obviously, if the question of whether X is 
a genuine domain is meaningful and has an answer (as Scanlon seems to 
suggest), why would we not here – as elsewhere – grant that our central 
doxastic goal is to have accurate beliefs about this question? Why would 
practical concerns suddenly pre-empt our ordinary epistemic standards?8  
 
Perhaps a weightier concern, however, is that if we are right to read Scanlon 
as combining easy ontology about internal questions with pragmatism about 
external questions, his view appears hard to distinguish from an 
unattractively global hermeneutic fictionalism. According to hermeneutic 
fictionalism about a discourse (such as about normative discourse), the best 
understanding of the discourse – for instance, of what we aim at when 
engaging in it – doesn’t involve a commitment to truth, but to something like 
a pretense of truth, or perhaps truth-in-the-fiction (Eklund 2015, section 
2.2). And on the current suggestion, Scanlon’s view is like hermeneutic 
fictionalism in the sense that on this theory our assertions of the form 
domain D exists are not characteristically guided by our evidence for those 
beliefs, but instead by the usefulness of the assertive practice.  
 
The view also threatens to infect the intra-domain level, derivatively. To see 
this, consider an example: suppose that I take 2+2=4 to be true in virtue of 
being licensed by the mathematical standards. But if, in going in for 
mathematical talk, I think (with Scanlon) that it doesn’t matter whether  a 
mathematical domain that includes such standards really exists, I seem to be 
indifferent to the very thing that would, if it existed, ground the truth of my 
ordinary mathematical claim. This is a familiar phenomenon: if one is an 
instrumentalist about the existence of unobservable theoretical entities, this 
naturally entails instrumentalism about specific scientific claims about – e.g. 
– bosons. So Scanlon's fictionalism, unlike that of many contemporary 
fictionalists, threatens to become an unattractive  global thesis.    
 
One might seek to block this conclusion by suggesting a slightly different 
interpretation in which an intra-domain thesis is true if it is useful for 
speakers to talk about that domain. This might help to limit the fictionalism 
in question to just explicit talk of domains. But it seems to have objectionable 
modal consequences. Suppose that some proposition P is licensed by the 
standards of domain D. Suppose further that we should go in for D-talk. So P 
is (according to Scanlon) true. Now consider a possible world in which we 
should not go in for D-talk (if “the only question” about domains is pragmatic, 
such a world must be possible). Does this mean that P is not true at that 
world? (Or, at least: not true for the same reasons it is true here?) This sort of 
                                                          
8 For one attempt to tie ground epistemic justification in our deepest practical concerns, see 
Enoch and Schechter 2008; for some critique, see McPherson and Plunkett 2015. But we 
don’t think that this discussion can help Scanlon here.  
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possibility threatens to make all true existence claims true contingently, and, 
what’s worse, contingently on the wrong kind of considerations: pragmatic 
considerations. Especially seeing that one of Scanlon’s main examples is that 
of mathematics, this is a very unappetizing bullet to bite (Had the 
mathematical domain not been useful, would numbers and sets not have 
existed? Would two plus two not have equaled four?).9 Given what Scanlon 
has to say about the judgment- and choice-independence of reasons 
elsewhere (93ff), this is not a bullet that he should be happy to bite.10  
 
This worry too is related to the one about the disappearing gap between 
Scanlon’s view and hermeneutic fictionalism – for arguably, hermeneutic 
fictionalist views face related modal worries (compare Kim 2005).  
 
Despite the text we have canvassed, we have a hard time believing either of 
these variants could be Scanlon’s considered view. The pragmatist reading is 
hard to square with Scanlon’s apparent goal of providing a reasoned defense 
of the metanormative desiderata mentioned in §1. After all, on the reading 
we are considering, Scanlon is committed only to its being useful to talk as if 
there is a normative domain for which those desiderata hold. But that is 
surely inadequate to vindicate those desiderata.11  
                                                          
9 Two points are in order here.  
First, a clarification. The counterfactual in the text here is importantly different from had the 
mathematical domain not been useful, we wouldn’t have had a reason to believe in numbers 
and sets. Perhaps some understandings of indispensability arguments render this sentence 
plausible – our reason to believe in some entities may depend on their (theoretical) 
usefulness. Not so for their existence itself.  
Second, the point in the text becomes more problematic to state when applied to normative 
discourse, because talk of whether or not we should go in for D-talk is already normative. 
This allows Scanlon some room for the dialectical moves he uses in dealing with Enoch’s 
previous critical discussion of Scanlon’s metaethics. (See Enoch (2011, section 5.3.1), 
Scanlon (29); See also McPherson (2011); and see our discussion below, in section 6). But 
Scanlon’s ontological discussion aims at full generality, and so, if it is refuted by the 
mathematical case (or any other one), it is refuted, period. 
As Daniel Wodak pointed out to us, if talk of what discourses we have pragmatic reason to 
engage is normative (and so, presumably, a part of the normative domain), and if the truth of 
any true proposition in any domain is ultimately explained at least partly in terms of the 
reason we have to engage in that domain, then all domains seem to be in an important sense 
dependent on the normative. It is far from obvious that this is an attractive result.  
10 On the other hand, Scanlon (2012, 234) does allow for reasons to depend on general facts 
about human nature. So perhaps he can insist that our reasons to go in for D-talk depend 
only on general facts about human nature? This would allow him to bite the bullet in the text. 
But, first, a bullet it will remain; second, of course, we need to hear more about the 
dependence of (basic) moral judgments on human nature; third, why think that the only 
reasons relevant to usefulness of domains are those that depend on human nature? 
11 Perhaps there’s room in logical space for a related view – one according to which the only 
intelligible questions about domains such as D are, roughly, whether it’s useful to go in for D-
talk; but that once the answer to this question is “yes”, licensed D-propositions (that is, 
within the domain) are true simpliciter, not just relative to D. We don’t know of attempts to 
develop such a view in the literature, in metaethics or elsewhere, by either fictionalists or 
realists of Scanlon’s kind. Perhaps this is not without reason.  
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Further evidence against a pragmatist or fictionalist reading is provided by 
the fact that Scanlon rejects familiar ‘indispensability’ arguments for 
ontological commitments in mathematics. These, he complains, would show 
mathematics to be useful,12 but not provide reasons for us to believe that 
they exist (27-8).  This seems to suggest that he rejects the pragmatist’s 
characteristic gambit.   
 
We thus both hope and expect that Scanlon will reject the reading of his view 
as global hermeneutic fictionalism. But if he does this, it again becomes 
unclear how his view is different from Modest’s view, and what role the talk 
of domains is supposed to play in his theorizing.  
 
 
5. What Progress Has Been Made?  
 
The preceding sections have focused on difficulties in interpreting the view 
that Scanlon sets out in this book. In the remainder of the paper, we seek to 
bracket those difficulties to the extent this is possible, and critically examine 
the metanormative view as we understand it. We think that the challenges 
we will offer apply to Scanlon's view however it is precisified vis-à-vis the 
interpretive questions raised in previous sections. In this section, we 
consider two of the central challenges to non-reductive normative realism 
that Scanlon purports to have solved: a supervenience challenge, and an 
epistemic challenge. We will ask two questions about each of Scanlon’s 
solutions: The first is whether the solutions are promising. The second is 
whether the solutions appeal in important ways to the distinctive view being 
developed. In particular, could our foil – Modest – simply appropriate these 
solutions on behalf of her shamelessly ontologically committal (e.g., non-
naturalistic) realism? This second question is especially important in 
evaluating Scanlon’s view. For often, the proof of the philosophical pudding is 
in the theoretical eating: the attractiveness of the complicated metaphysical 
and metaphilosophical view discussed above will partly depend on its 
explanatory payoffs with respect to issues like these. If when push comes to 
shove, Scanlon’s responses to such general objections are not significantly 
different from the ones that Modest can put forward (or, indeed, that her 
allies have been suggesting), this will undermine a seemingly major 
motivation for the attempt to find an ontologically non-committal realist 
option.  
 
5.1 Supervenience 
                                                          
12 Notice that at least on a natural way of understanding such arguments, the kind of 
usefulness they invoke is theoretical usefulness. If even this kind of usefulness is one Scanlon 
is committed to rejecting as a guide to truth, the line of thought from note 6 above is not 
available to him.  
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According to Scanlon, the supervenience puzzle is this: 
 
Supervenience:  How are facts about reasons related to facts about what occurs, and what 
causes what, in the natural world? Normative facts are not entailed by such 
natural facts, but at least many normative facts depend on non-normative 
facts: they vary when non-normative facts vary and cannot vary as long as 
non-normative facts remain the same. This seems puzzling, and in need of 
explanation. (3) 
  
We insist on one addition to this formulation (which we think Scanlon would 
accept): many philosophers have taken the supervenience of the normative 
to be modally robust: to hold across conceptual (or at least metaphysical) 
possibilities. So what is to be explained is not merely actual covariance 
(which might, after all, have been accidental) but modally robust covariance.  
 
Scanlon’s explanation begins by distinguishing pure from mixed normative 
claims. Pure normative claims are those that ‘do not depend on non-
normative claims at all’. Mixed normative claims are made true jointly by 
pure normative claims in conjunction with non-normative claims.  
 
Scanlon’s own preferred structure for the pure normative claims – a four-
place reason relation - is a bit unwieldy. And Scanlon grants correctly that his 
reasons-fundamentalism is inessential to the explanatory core of his view 
(42). In light of this, we will illustrate Scanlon’s idea with an (overly) simple 
normative theory: simple act utilitarianism.   
  
Utilitarianism  one ought to perform the act, among one’s options, that 
maximizes net pleasure. 
 
Suppose that Utilitarianism is the fundamental truth about what we ought to 
do, and that pleasure is a non-normative concept. So understood, 
Utilitarianism is a pure normative claim: it is not grounded in some more 
fundamental normative truth, combined with some non-normative fact. If it 
were true, Utilitarianism would partly ground a host of mixed normative 
claims. For example, if telling tasteless jokes at the party will fail to maximize 
pleasure, then this fact, together with Utilitarianism would fully ground the 
fact that one ought not to tell such jokes at the party.  
 
Scanlon’s way of explaining supervenience is straightforward. Mixed 
normative truths supervene on non-normative truths, and this 
supervenience is explained by the pure normative truths (40). For example, 
the covariance of what I ought to do with certain non-normative properties 
would be nicely explained by Utilitarianism, were it true. Truths about the 
supervenience of the pure normative truths on the non-normative truths is 
explained as follows: the pure normative truths do not vary (41), and hence – 
trivially – they do not vary independently of the non-normative truths. 
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Together, Scanlon suggests that these two claims constitute a complete 
explanation of the supervenience of the normative. 
 
The first thing to notice about this explanation is that it does not appear to 
rely on anything distinctive in Scanlon’s account: if the explanation works, 
Modest can deploy it in her theorizing just as well as Scanlon can, even if she 
is not a fan of Scanlon’s talk of domains, and her metanormative non-
naturalism is as ontologically committal as can be. This is because all that one 
needs to make Scanlon’s explanation work is the idea that mixed normative 
claims are explained in terms of more fundamental pure normative claims 
(together with non-normative facts).13  
 
We do not, however, think that Scanlon’s explanation does everything we 
should want. For in order for the explanation of the mixed normative claims 
to work, there must be a pure normative property or relation (in our 
example: obligatoriness) that is necessarily coextensive with a non-
normative property or relation (in our example: pleasure-maximization). If 
one was puzzled at all by the covariance of the normative and the non-
normative, it is very hard to understand how explaining such covariation by 
committing oneself to an underlying necessary covariation between 
obligatoriness and pleasure maximization is going to help. For one would 
thereby have solved the initial problem by positing exactly the same sort of 
‘puzzling’ modal relation to do the explanatory work.14  
 
None of this is to claim that the supervenience problem for non-naturalism is 
insoluble, or that it is a death-blow to the non-naturalist if it is (see again 
Enoch 2011, section 6.2, and McPherson 2012; 2015, esp. Sections 4 and 5, 
for relevant discussion). It is simply to say that it is hard to see how Scanlon’s 
own discussion makes any progress here. In particular, the attempt to be 
ontologically non-committal doesn’t seem to be making any difference here – 
the supervenience challenge retains its full force (whatever exactly that is) 
when we move from Modest’s ontologically committed realism to Scanlon’s 
purportedly non-committal one.  
 
5.2 Epistemology 
 
The core epistemological challenge that Scanlon addresses is this: if there are 
irreducibly normative facts about reasons, how can we come to know these 
                                                          
13 And indeed, some of what Enoch (2011, section 6.2) says about supervenience is precisely 
along these lines. See especially the explanation of what Enoch calls specific supervenience 
(section 6.2.2.1).  
14 This is an instance of what McPherson 2012 calls ‘bruteness revenge’. Enoch (2011, §6.2) 
attempts a response, but is no longer confident that it works. 
Ralph Wedgwood (forthcoming) makes a similar point. Schroeder (2014,142) proposes a 
way for the non-naturalist to finesse this problem. However, Schroeder’s proposal is 
explicitly inconsistent with some of Scanlon’s central commitments.   
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facts (69; 120)? According to Scanlon, we can reply to this question in two 
stages.  
 
The first, negative stage of Scanlon’s reply to this epistemological challenge 
involves arguing against the idea that normative facts are a ‘special sort of 
entity’, epistemic access to which would require a faculty analogous to sense 
perception (70). We think Scanlon takes this to be a payoff of the alleged 
metaphysical thinness of his view. The idea is that only if one thought 
normative facts were metaphysically substantive, would one have to explain 
by what faculty we came to be in contact with the normative entities.  
 
The positive stage of Scanlon’s argument begins with the suggestion that 
quite generally, what is needed to answer the epistemological question is 
“…an overall account of the subject matter of a domain that fits with a 
plausible epistemology in the right way.” (71). Scanlon thinks such an 
account for the normative will itself be a (very general) normative claim. 
However, as Scanlon notes, we can then seemingly run the same 
epistemological challenge concerning the account of the subject matter itself. 
Scanlon replies that this challenge can be met by the method of reflective 
equilibrium. 
 
Crucially, Scanlon thinks that because normative facts do not have “some 
special metaphysical character”, the only skeptical arguments they are 
vulnerable to are arguments based on substantive normative reasoning (86). 
So Scanlon’s alleged avoidance of metaphysical commitment is again claimed 
to do key work here.  
 
We think that Scanlon is incorrect about the range of possible skeptical 
arguments, and consequently about the payoffs of his metaphysical 
commitments. Indeed, we think that the hardest form of the central 
epistemological challenge in the vicinity grants the truth of our central 
normative beliefs, and the objectivity that Scanlon assumes such beliefs 
have.15 Granting this entails that there is a correlation between our beliefs 
and the truths that they are about. This assumption seems extremely 
important – perhaps necessary for responsible normative reasoning and 
belief – and it certainly seems to call for explanation. So there is a deep 
explanatory demand here: to (at least schematically) explain this correlation 
(compare Enoch 2011, §7.2).  
 
Notice that this way of understanding the epistemic challenge is not about 
the initial justification for our relevant normative beliefs. The worry, rather, 
                                                          
15 We take the challenge we sketch in the text to be the right way of understanding the 
epistemological core of the ‘evolutionary’ challenge made prominent by Joyce 2006, Ch. 6 
and especially Street 2006. See Vavova 2015 for an alternative characterization of the 
epistemic structure of the general challenge.  
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is that however initially justified, if we come to believe that there is no way of 
explaining the correlation between a set of our beliefs and the relevant 
truths, our initial justification can be defeated. Notice, also, that the challenge 
thus understood has nothing (directly) to do with causal influence of any 
sort. The problem is that we seem committed to a surprising, unexplained, 
and perhaps inexplicable correlation.  
 
This challenge puts us in a position to make three points. First, our way of 
stating the challenge does not make any assumptions about where the 
normative facts are ‘located’. It is completely general and does not rely on 
such metaphors. 
 
Second, this challenge helps to show that the negative side of Scanlon’s 
strategy is dubious. Indeed, far from being invitations to skeptical challenge, 
metaphysical assumptions can be useful elements of candidate theories that 
meet the fundamental explanatory burden here. For example, consider the 
idea that the fundamental normative relations are causally efficacious. This 
would allow for the possibility that the normative facts causally regulate our 
normative beliefs, which could help to explain the correlation between 
normative facts and beliefs.16 Or consider George Bealer’s (e.g. 2000) modal 
reliabilism, which aims (inter alia) to explain such correlations without 
appeal to causation. As these examples show, rejecting metaphysical 
assumptions limits the resources available to address the underlying 
problem.   
  
Third, and most importantly, it is very unclear to us how the distinctive 
elements of Scanlon’s systematic proposal – the attempt at metaphysical 
lightness, the crucial reference to domains, etc. – could help to ameliorate the 
epistemic challenge. Explaining the correlation between our beliefs and the 
relevant truths doesn’t seem easier if we discard the heavy ontology Modest 
is committed to.  
 
One could take the correlation here to be a matter of brute luck (as in e.g. 
Rosen 1998, 398; or Dworkin 2011, 77ff), but it’s doubtful that one can ever 
be epistemically justified in so doing. If the (purported) correlation has no 
explanation, it seems more reasonable to respond by reconsidering one’s 
commitment to the correlation, than by accepting it as brute. And if one 
responds by lowering one’s credence in the correlation between the 
normative truths and one’s normative judgments significantly, it seems that 
one should also decrease one’s confidence in the normative judgments 
themselves, perhaps to the point of suspension of judgment. Skepticism 
threatens.  
                                                          
16 Some of the guise-of-the-good literature discusses the causal efficacy of values – for 
instance, in serving as causes of desires - in a way that fits the text here. See, for instance, 
Oddie (2005), Schafer (2013), and Wedgwood (2006). 
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Perhaps there is some way for Scanlon to acknowledge the challenge in its 
strongest form, and then to argue that accepting the correlation as brute is 
only unacceptable on an ontologically “heavy” view. This would show that 
the distinctive features of Scanlon’s account can do genuine work. But of 
course, we would need to see the details here – in particular, we would need 
to see why taking the correlation to be brute is acceptable on Scanlon’s view, 
and more so than on Modest’s. Because we have no idea how this reply might 
go, the explanatory virtues of the sort of view that Scanlon hopes to develop 
remain elusive. 
   
 
6. Schmeasons (and another word about fictionalism) 
 
In previous work (McPherson 2011, Enoch 2011, Section 5.3),  we offered 
what we might call the ‘schmeasons’ (or ‘counter-reasons’) challenge to 
Scanlon. The basic idea is this. Consider two linguistic communities – the 
‘reasoners’ and the ‘schmeasoners’. Each community has a certain term – 
‘reason’ and ‘schmeason’ respectively – that they take to be central to their 
normative practices. And in each community there are well-developed 
practices of criticism and evaluation that use the relevant term. But the 
reasoners and schmeasoners tend towards quite different substantive views 
in their practices. If we suppose that these practices are coherent, and 
constitute their own domains, then both communities might be functioning 
quite well relative to their respective domains. But intuitively, we want to say 
that all is not well: it is bad that the schmeasoners are sensitive to 
schmeasons rather than reasons.  
 
This, however, looks like an objection that can be raised perfectly 
symmetrically from within each of the two domains. For the schmeasoners 
can point out that it is ‘schbad’ that we are sensitive to reasons rather than 
schmeasons. Our suggestion was that a metaphysically committal realism 
does a better job capturing what we intuitively want to say. This is because 
the metaphysically committal realist can say that only the reasoners – and 
not the schmeasoners – track the normative structure of reality.   
 
Scanlon replies this way:  
 
This problem seems to me illusory. These imagined conclusions about “counter-
reasons” conflict with our conclusions about reasons only insofar as they are 
interpreted as conclusions about reasons. (29) 
 
But this reply misses the point of the objection. It is not about whether we 
genuinely disagree with the schmeasoners. (Explaining how that is possible 
is a deep but wholly different challenge, which we are also unsure how to 
meet on Scanlon’s behalf).  The point is that it seems wrong to say that – 
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epistemically speaking – everything is fine with the schmeasoners. The 
schmeasoners – we say – are like people who have the concept GRUE rather 
than GREEN: their way of thinking about reality is inapt (compare Sider 2011 
§1.1). As Enoch (2011, 123-4) points out, it is characteristic of fictionalism to 
lack the resources to make such claims. If I am talking about fiction A, and 
you about fiction B, I can hardly characterize your way of talking as less 
fitting to reality, since both ways are simply spinning out their respective 
fantasies. True, from within fiction A, A-statements are privileged over B-
statements. Just as true, of course, is the claim that from within fiction B, B-
statements are privileged over A-statements. In a fictionalist framework, 
there doesn’t seem to be anything that can break this symmetry. Once again, 
if you’re committed to only doing things, as it were, from the fiction-A-
perspective, you have an asymmetry. Similarly, in the opposite direction, if 
you’re already committed to doing things from the fiction-B perspective. 
Scanlon seems (at the very least) analogous to the fictionalist who is 
committed to doing things from within the reason-fiction, rather than the 
schmeason-fiction. This doesn’t seem to give us the kind of objectivity we are 
after. 
 
This brings us yet again to a request for what would be a useful clarification: 
what, in Scanlon’s view, distinguishes fictional domains from non-fictional 
ones? Scanlon seems committed to the distinction (18; 24 n. 9). But we don’t 
yet see how he can make it out.   
 
 
7. What’s the Argument? 
  
This puts us in a position to put a final challenge to Scanlon, and with it a final 
request for more details. The book does much to at least give a feel of the 
view Scanlon accepts (although, as we explained in earlier sections, often in 
ways that leave crucial questions about the view unanswered). But nowhere 
in the book did we find even an attempt at an argument for the view. This is 
striking given that there is nothing obvious about the view. Why should we 
believe it, then? What reason does Scanlon offer to support it? We are told 
that Scanlon thinks that the domain-centric way of thinking “makes the most 
sense” (19). And we are told that it is “better to avoid [certain] questions 
altogether” (24). But we found it difficult to find in the book anything more 
by way of argument for the view it puts forward.  
 
One possibility is that Scanlon’s aim is to argue by elimination. He engages in 
detail Mark Schroeder’s Humeanism, Allan Gibbard’s expressivism, and 
Christine Korsgaard’s constructivism, offering reasons – sometimes powerful 
ones – to reject them. But if Scanlon wants to argue by elimination, he needs 
to address all relevant alternatives. And as we’ve shown, he leaves 
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unilluminated his two most salient foils: non-deflationary forms of normative 
realism (such as Modest’s), and hermeneutic fictionalism.17   
 
Perhaps a more charitable interpretation is that Scanlon aims to have his 
view earn its keep by its explanatory payoffs. But at least with non-
deflationary realism and hermeneutical fictionalism as the relevant 
competing theories, the discussion in §5 suggests that the distinctive features 
of Scanlon’s view do not provide explanatory payoffs with respect to 
supervenience and epistemology. If this is true more generally, as we 
suspect,18 it will be extremely difficult to mount this sort of explanatory case 
for the view.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
As we suggested at the outset, perhaps the most compelling motivation for 
the sort of view Scanlon seems to prefer is the idea that it can provide the 
sort of explanatory power promised by the quasi-realist program, without 
the discomforts – both technical and intuitive – that many find with the 
expressivism that usually undergirds such quasi-realism. Or – to proceed 
from the other direction – to secure the objectivity for morality and 
normativity promised by realism, without the potentially problematic 
ontological baggage other realists are committed to. While there is much to 
admire in this book, we think it falls significantly short of delivering on this 
promise. As we argued in §§5-6, it is far from clear that Scanlon’s view can do 
the sort of explanatory work that more overtly ontologically committal forms 
of realism can. And where it can, this is usually because it can appeal to just 
the same sort of explanation that such robust realists provide. For these 
reasons, we are not yet convinced that Scanlon has sketched a compelling 
competitor to the ontologically committal realism that we favor. Further, as 
we have sought to show in §§2-4, much still needs to be done to clarify and 
develop the philosophically crucial structure of the view discussed. Given the 
interest of the project pursued in this book, we will count our discussion a 
success if it encourages Scanlon to make such clarifications and provide the 
needed further details.    
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